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Abstract
The public housing sector provides housing units at below-market rents, potentially al-
lowing its tenants to save for a downpayment more quickly than they would have otherwise.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of a spell in public housing on age at first-time homeown-
ership using the French Housing Survey. We use a pseudo-panel approach that takes into
account the specificities of the local housing market, to derive individual tenure transitions
from multiple cross-sections data. Using an IV strategy to control for a potential selection
into public housing, we jointly estimate public housing tenancy and duration before first-time
homeownership, and take into account unobserved heterogeneity. Our results indicate that
a spell in public housing increases the hazard to homeownership, supporting the idea that,
in France, the public housing policy provides an important pathway to homeownership.
Keywords: Homeownership, Public housing, Tenure choice, Duration model, Unobserved het-
erogeneity.
JEL Codes: R21, R31, R38, C41.
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1 Introduction
In most European countries, a strong public housing sector provides cheap and good quality
housing to a substantial share of the population. Although the scope and the implementation
of the policy vary across countries, its purpose is always to ensure minimal housing conditions
to all households. There is no consensus on the effect of this policy, since the literature has
provided evidence of both positive and negative externalities on individual outcomes.1
This paper provides an empirical test of the existence of an interplay between a spell in
public housing and the homeownership decision. In particular, we study the effect of a spell in
public housing on age at first-time homeownership.
This question is of particular interest in France where the public housing sector represents
37% of the rental housing stock, and shelter more than 10 millions of people (a sixth of the
total population). In contrast to the US, French public housing tenants are not trapped in this
segment of the housing market.2 One of the key feature of public housing in France is the level of
rents, which are on average 40% below market prices. What remains unclear is how the induced
welfare gain influences households’ consumption and saving behavior. Le Blanc and Laferre`re
(2001) find that tenants in public housing consume more than their counterparts in private
renting, with 10% more of housing services and 11% more of other goods. These welfare gains
might be large since the eligibility conditions exclude only the 30% richest households. Given
this effect on consumption, one could also suspect a positive effect on savings. If this were true,
1 Fertig and Reingold (2007) test the existence of an effect of public housing on health. Currie and Yelowitz
(2000) show that the seemingly negative effect of public housing on individual outcomes is driven by unobserved
heterogeneity. Once controlled for this unobserved element, they show that public housing decreases the likelihood
to live in overcrowded housing and children are less likely to have been held back at school. Newman and Harkness
(2002) show that on the long run, children who have grown up in public housing tend to fare better as adults,
which could be interpreted as the consequences of improved housing conditions and increased expenditures on
items that benefit children development. Jacob (2004) finds no direct effect of public housing on student outcomes
in Canada, although there is an indirect negative effect through the concentration of public housing in deprived
neighborhood. Reingold et al. (2001) find similar results for the effect of public housing on social capital investment
and labor participation in the US. As to labor-market outcomes, Currie and Yelowitz (1998) and de Graaff et al.
(2009) find negative effects of public housing. Using French data, Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot (2009) show that
public housing has no direct effect on unemployment risk, even tough the concentration of public housing in
deprived neighborhood may alter the public tenants’ long term career opportunity.
2The annual mobility rate of public tenants is around 8%, close to the rate of 8.7% observed for the general
population (Source: French Housing Survey). In terms of transition, more than one out of four of mobile public
housing renters make a transition to homeownership.
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a spell in public housing might increase the household’s ability to constitute a downpayment
and hence foster homeownership attainment. As a consequence, the public housing policy might
be an instrument indirectly promoting homeownership.
The effect of public housing on savings may be tempered by negative externalities effects
on individuals’ labor market outcomes. As shown by de Graaff et al. (2009) on European data,
public housing tenants are less mobile on the labor market because of higher mobility costs and
have therefore less job opportunities. Furthermore, the remote location of public housing often
results in lower employment levels due to spatial mismatch. Finally, the social composition of
public housing projects could generate negative neighborhood effects, and public housing could
hence constitute a poverty trap. The existence of positive and negative impacts leaves undecided
the final effect of a spell in public housing on subsequent homeownership attainment.
Using repeated cross-sections from the French Housing Survey (FHS, hereafter), we create a
panel data of both households and housing characteristics. We jointly estimate age at first-time
homeownership and the probability of a previous spell in public renting. We control for self-
selection into public housing using an IV strategy based on the share of public housing within
rental housing in the urban area. We introduce unobserved heterogeneity to account for any
remaining correlation between previous tenure and age at first-time homeownership. Following
Heckman and Singer (1984), we adopt a discrete distribution approach to limit the effects of
distributional assumptions on estimation results.
Our results show that public housing plays a role in helping some households achieve home-
ownership, supporting the idea that the public housing fosters the housing wealth of some part
of the population, speeding up transition to homeownership.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2, we present the econometric model
and the identification conditions. Section 3 is devoted to the data and the pseudo-panel proce-
dure. In section 4, we provide some descriptive statistics and our estimation results. The last
section concludes.
3
2 Estimation Strategy
We propose an analysis of the duration before first-time homeownership controlling for a po-
tential preceding spell in public housing. To do so, we estimate jointly a logistic model for the
existence of a spell in public housing and a duration model of age at homeownership. Our joint
model is designed to correct for a potential self-selection into public housing. The logit equation
controls for the probability to have been a public tenant, while the duration model estimates
the determinants of homeownership.
In contrast to regression models, unobserved heterogeneity in duration models is not absorbed
into an error term and leads to an estimation bias. Therefore, we use a finite mixture approach to
control for potential unobserved heterogeneity and its correlation with unobserved determinants
of the selection in public housing (Heckman and Singer, 1984).
2.1 Econometric Model
As noted by Boehm and Schlottmann (2004, 2009), homeownership is not a single period deci-
sion, but a dynamic process which requires the constitution of a downpayment. To account for
this, we use a duration analysis to capture the effect of household’s characteristics and preceding
tenure on age at first-time homeownership.
The proportional hazard duration model is particularly popular in the literature because
it allows one to consistently estimate a baseline hazard non-parametrically. In the case of
homeownership however, it may cause some identification issues due to the difficulty to capture
the behaviour at the tail of the distribution. Therefore, we use a parametric log-normal model.
In a duration model of homeownership attainment, the hazard function λ(t) is the probability
to access homeownership at time t+dt conditional on being tenant at date t. The hazard function
can be written as:
λ(t) =
1
σt
φ
(
log(t)− (Zγ + αp+ νh)
σ
)/(
1− Φ
(
log(t)− (Zγ + αp+ νh)
σ
))
(1)
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with φ the density function of the normal law and Φ its cumulative distribution function, Z a
vector of observed characteristics, p a dummy for the previous tenure being public housing, α
the parameter of interest, γ a vector of parameters to be estimated, νh an idiosyncratic term
accounting for unobserved variables and σ the standard deviation. Note that νh will be assumed
to be correlated with a similar term in the public housing equation. Using the hazard function,
one can derive the density, f(t) and the survival function, S(t) which enter in the sample log-
likelihood:
`h(t | Z, p, γ, νh) =
N∑
i=1
[
(1− δi) log f(ti | Zi, pi, γ, νhi) + δi logS(ti | Zi, pi, γ, νhi)
]
(2)
with δi = 0 for uncensored observations (households attaining homeownership during the obser-
vation period) and δi = 1 for censored observations (still renters at the end of the observation
period).
We next consider that the probability of being previously in public housing p (p = 1 if the
former tenure was public housing and p = 0 otherwise) follows a logit specification with νp an
idiosyncratic term accounting for unobserved traits:
Pr(p = 1 | X, νp) = Pp = exp(Xβ + νp)
1 + exp(Xβ + νp)
Pr(p = 0 | X, νp) = 1− Pp = 1− exp(Xβ + νp)
1 + exp(Xβ + νp)
(3)
The corresponding sample log-likelihood is:
`p(p | X,β, νp) =
N∑
i=1
pi log(Ppi) + (1− pi) log(1− Ppi) (4)
We control for unobserved heterogeneity by adopting the non-parametric approach proposed
by Heckman and Singer (1984). This method consists of assuming the existence of several types
of individuals, each characterized by specific values of parameters νh and νp that affect public
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housing tenancy and age at first-time homeownership. The unobserved characteristics νh and νp
are assumed to follow a discrete bivariate distribution with mass points whose locations are to
be estimated. The number of mass points K will be chosen based on a goodness of fit criteria.
There are thus 2K types of individuals given by the combinations of K mass points, and 2K − 1
probabilities to belong to one given type, to be estimated.
Finally, the joint log-likelihood of the two-equations model is:
``(t, p | Z,X, β, γ, νh, νp) =
∫
νh
∫
νp
`h(t | Z, p, α, γ, νh) ∗ `p(p | X,β, νp)dG{νh, νp} (5)
Although our preferred specification includes unobserved heterogeneity, we will also provide
the results of the model without unobserved heterogeneity using a two-step estimation.
The covariates in these equations relate to the demographic situation of the household (house-
hold head gender, marital status, number of children, citizenship) and its permanent income (ed-
ucation and income decile). We further account for a temporal effect by including six dummies
for different time periods. These variables are listed in Table 4.
2.2 Identification
The selection of agents into public housing induces an endogeneity in the determinants and the
timing of homeownership. Therefore, we use an IV strategy.
In the housing literature, authors have often used aggregate-level instruments, such as the
regional share of homeowners in van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004); Munch et al. (2006) and
Munch et al. (2008).
To study the effect of public housing on unemployment in France, Dujardin and Goffette-
Nagot (2009) use the percentage of public housing at the city level as an instrument. The
underlying idea is that the variation in the supply of public housing across cities may create
city-level variation in the probability of being in public housing.
Following this idea, we use the share of public tenants among renters at the urban area level
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as instrument. For obvious reasons, the share of public housing is expected to influence the
probability to have a spell in public housing. In the rest of this section, we will argue that
the share of public tenants is uncorrelated with our variable of interest, the age at first-time
homeownership. Since we do not have an alternative instrument, that could have allowed us to
perform an exogeneity test, we provide several reasoning that support our exogeneity claim.
First, a source of correlation between our instrument and our variable of interest is a potential
sorting of individuals into cities with high share of public housing. We argue that this type of
sorting is very unlikely since the stock of public housing is not informative of the supply of
vacant public housing. Furthermore, the bias implied by this sorting, if any, would induce a
negative effect of public housing on age at first-time homeownership, since households with
high preferences for public housing would attain homeownership later or never, and would be
concentrated in the cities with high rates of public housing. Yet, as our results show, we obtain
an opposite effect of public housing on homeownership attainment. Hence, if the instrument
was to bias the estimate, this would not in any case induce our result.
Second, the correlation between the share of public housing in the urban area and the
characteristics of the local market for owner-occupied homes may be of concern. Using the
share of public housing among rental housing and not among the whole housing stock limits the
risk of correlation between the instrument and the share of owner-occupied homes. Since the
weig(ht of public housing among rental housing varies greatly across French urban areas, from
10% to 76% with a mean at around 40%, this provides a source of variation that is likely to
break up the relationship between the share of public housing and the rate of owner-occupied
housing.
Finally, we support this informal assessment of our instrumental variable with a test showing
the absence of any statistical correlation between our instrument and age at first-homeownership.
To do so, we estimate the equation of age at first-time homeownership including three different
characteristics of the housing stock in the urban area: the share of owner-occupied housing in
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the housing stock, the share of public housing in the housing stock, and the share of public
housing in the tenant-occupied housing stock.
Table 1 shows that all these characteristics have the appropriate effect: ceteris paribus,
living in an urban area with a large share of owner-occupied housing decreases age at first-time
homeownership, whereas the opposite holds true for the share of public housing, when measured
relatively to the whole housing stock. In contrast, the last column of Table 1 shows that the
share of public housing in the tenant-occupied housing stock has no significant effect on age at
first-time homeownership, suggesting the conditional exogeneity of our instrumental variable.
Table 1: The impact of local housing market characteristics on homeownership
Instruments Age at first-time Age at first-time Age at first-time
homeownership homeownership homeownership
% of homeowners in the housing stock 0.33***(0.05)
% of public tenants in the housing stock -0.292***(0.07)
% of public tenants among renters -0.17 (0.11)
Controls for household characteristics YES YES YES
Observations 3,773 3,773 3,773
Notes: i) The estimations are run on our main sample, defined in section 3. They include controls for
the following household characteristics: household head gender, living in couple, number of children,
citizenship, education, income decile. Housing stock characteristics are measured based on 1999 Census
data. ii) Standard errors clustered on urban areas between parentheses.∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
3 Data
Our estimation uses data from the French Housing Survey (FHS). The FHS is conducted every
four years since 1955 on large and representative samples of the French housing stock. The survey
provides both the characteristics of the housing (tenure, number of rooms, floor area, comfort
level) and the characteristics of the households living in these housing units (socio-demographics,
income, labor-market situation). Moreover, it includes some retrospective information, in par-
ticular, the year of arrival in the dwelling and the characteristics of the former dwelling if a
mobility occurs in the four preceding years. Table 2 reports the mobility of public tenants over
our period of study.
8
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on transitions between public housing and homeownership
FHS 1984 FHS 1988 FHS 1992 FHS 1996 FHS 2002 FHS 2006
Annual mobility rate
of PH tenants 8.1 7.4 7.8 7.2 7.1 -
Transition of PH tenants (% of public housing tenants in t-4)
to PH 32.9 40.0 41.2 45.8 44.4 53.0
to homeownership 47.7 41.9 32.5 30.8 31.7 27.1
Previous tenure of first-time homeowners (% of new homeowners in t)
in PH 31.1 29.0 23.9 24.3 24.8 20.4
in private renting 57.8 60.1 64.8 65.2 66.6 69.3
Notes:
i) The mobility rate is computed as the ratio of the number of public tenants who moved
during the period between two surveys to the number of public tenants in the first of
these surveys and is then converted to annual rates. The transitions of public housing
tenants are computed based on mobile households of which tenure was public housing
four years before the survey. First-time homeowners are mobile households that were not
homeowners four years before the survey and are homeowners at the survey. ii) Source:
French Housing Survey 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2002, 2006.
Since mobile agents are a non-random sample of the population, using the subsample of
mobile agents, with known previous tenure, will cause a sample selection bias. To avoid this
bias, but still be able to study the impact of public housing with a backward perspective that is
suitable to the analysis of a housing policy, we opted for the pseudo-panel approach described
in the next subsection.
3.1 Pseudo-Panel Approach
Even though the FHS is not a panel data, it is repeated every four years on a representative
sample. Hence, using these repeated cross-sections, we can use a set of tracking conditions to
impute the tenure of the previous dwelling for the households surveyed in 2006, but who arrive
in their housing before 2002 (previous tenure being unreported in this case). The idea to use
several cross-sections to recover individual transitions is commonly referred to as a pseudo-panel
approach and was initially developed by Deaton (1985). In practice, we improve the algorithm of
Browning et al. (1985) by taking into account the specificities of the local housing market. That
is, in addition to household characteristics, we include also urban area and housing characteristics
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to match households between the 2006 and older FHS.
The 2006 FHS records 31,069 households of which head is aged from 18 to 75 in metropolitan
France. Table 3 provides the arrival dates of these households depending on tenure. This table
shows in particular that households mobile in the four preceding years, for whom the previous
tenure is known, account for only a third of the sample. We use the pseudo-panel approach to
impute the previous dwelling tenure for those who had a mobility between 1979 and 2001 using
the 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2002 FHS. As a consequence, we are not able to recover the
former tenure of households who made a mobility before 1979, (2,201 households corresponding
to 9.2% of the 2006 FHS sample). The exclusion of long-time public tenants might bias our
estimation, as these households are precisely those who never achieved homeownership. As a
robustness check, we show in section 4.3 the results of the model including those individuals.
Table 3: Mobility year by tenure
Period of mobility Tenure
Home- Private Public Other Total
ownership renting Housing
Before 1979 14.8 1.5 6.0 5.0 9.2
1979-1983 8.4 1.2 4.3 4.0 5.6
1984-1987 7.7 1.4 5.2 4.1 5.5
1988-1991 8.2 2.4 6.0 6.0 6.2
1992-1997 14.7 8.1 14.6 13.6 13.0
1998-2002 24.1 25.7 29.7 25.5 25.8
2003-2006 22.1 59.7 34.2 41.8 34.8
Total 50.2 25.4 21.7 2.8 100.0
Notes: i) FHS 2006. 32,069 households in metropolitan France, head
aged 18 to 75. ii) The ”other” category consists of tenant farmers
and households housed for free by their family or employer.
The pseudo-panel procedure consists of matching households from the 2006 FHS to relevant
households observed in the previous FHS, depending on the year of their housing transition.
The matching criteria is a vector defined by the following variables: urban area, year of arrival,
citizenship in three categories (French, French by naturalization, Foreign), education in three
categories (Drop-out, High-School, College), housing floor area in four categories (- 40 , 40-69,
70-99, + 100 sq m), tenure after the residential mobility in four categories (homeowner, private
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tenant, public tenant, other tenure, that housed for free by parents or employer).3 In cases of
an unsuccessful match, we adjust the year of arrival by one year.
Applying this procedure, we succeed in recovering 1,340 household transitions from FHS
2002, 449 from FHS 1996, 356 from FHS 1992, 402 from FHS 1988, and 428 from FHS 1984.
Note that using the urban area dummy as a matching criteria strongly reduces the number of
successful matches, but seems important to account for local housing market conditions.
Our matching procedure has two downsides. First, since the match fails for some households,
recently-moving households are still overrepresented in the resulting sample. Second, the match-
ing rate is high both in the biggest urban areas and in rural areas, as the latter is clustered into
a single large category. As a consequence, households in Paris represent 47.7% of the successful
matches, to be compared to 23% in the original 2006 FHS sample, while households in rural
France account for 26% of the successful matches, to be compared with 10% in the original
sample. Furthermore, there are only 78 urban areas in our final sample instead of 326 in the
original sample.
We deal with the two issues by reducing the subsample of recent movers using a simple
random sampling method. After the procedure, we also exclude 1151 households of which
previous tenure was homeownership, since our focus is on first-time homeownership. This leaves
us with a final sample composed of 3,773 households.4
3There are 326 urban areas in the original sample with population ranging from 8,000 to 11,174,743 for Paris
4 To check the robustness of our sample, we ran several tests assessing the difference between the characteristics
of the samples of successfully matched households and unmatched households. Our tests conclude that there is
no significant difference between the two samples in terms of mean income and proportion of mobile individuals
per year (results are available upon request). Second, there may be a concern about the accuracy of our predicted
former tenure. As a robustness check, we selected randomly half of the recent movers from the 2006 FHS (for
whom the preceding tenure is known but is here assumed not to be), used the matching algorithm for matching
these households to other households within the 2006 FHS sample to obtain a predicted previous tenure and
compared the real to the predicted former tenure. We report 85% of correct answers. For 11% of the sample, we
do not predict a spell in public housing while they had one, and for 4% we incorrectly report a spell in public
housing. These figures show that our matching algorithm performs reasonably well in predicting former tenure.
Moreover, the measurement error induced by the use of the pseudo-panel approach to recover the preceding tenure
is likely to reduce the difference in the time before first-homeownership attributed to each type of renters, and
therefore to reduce the estimated effect of public housing.
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4 Results
4.1 Sample Statistics
Our working sample is composed of 3,773 households described in Table 4. 41% of this sample
consists of recent movers, 25% moved between 1998-2002 and each of the other periods of mobility
account for roughly 10% of the sample. The income distribution of the sample is similar to that
of the general population. 27.1 of the sample consists of households who were public tenants
and 64.6% were private tenants. 46.4% of individuals achieved first-time homeownership during
the observation period. Note that this proportion of homeowners in our sample is lower than
the 57.5% observed in the 2006 FHS because of the first-time homeownership restriction.
Table 5 reports the transition matrix during the period. 25.2% of transitions into first-time
homeownership originate from public housing, 66% from private renting and 8.8% from other
tenures. Public tenants are as likely to move to another public housing as to buy a house.
Transitions from public housing to private renting are less frequent. The other transitions
observed in the sample consist mainly of moves within private renting (20.6% of the sample)
and within public renting (11.6% of the sample)
Table 6 presents homeowners’ characteristics depending on whether they were in public
housing previously. 83% of current homeowners live with a partner, their families have more
children and about 5 % of them are immigrants. A third of them achieved homeownership before
age 30, and almost another third between 30 and 35. Compared to other homeowners, households
who bought a house after a spell in public housing have a lower educational level (74.1% with
less than high school degree against 51.9% for the others) and a lower income level (43.6% are in
the first five deciles against 35.2% for the others). Despite these clear-cut differences between the
two types of homeowners, the sample statistics do not show any significant differences in terms
of age when attaining homeownership. Given the low income of public tenants, we can suspect
that these households would have not achieved homeownership, or at a substantially higher age
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Table 4: Sample summary statistics
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max
Female 0.347 0.476 0 1
Living in partnership 0.662 0.473 0 1
Number of children 1.173 1.208 0 10
Age
Less than 30 0.089 0.285 0 1
from 30 to 39 0.316 0.465 0 1
from 40 to 49 0.298 0.457 0 1
from 50 to 64 0.253 0.436 0 1
More than 65 0.030 0.201 0 1
Citizenship
French at birth 0.892 0.311 0 1
French by naturalization 0.035 0.184 0 1
Foreign 0.073 0.261 0 1
Education
Less than High School Degree 0.603 0.489 0 1
High School Degree 0.094 0.292 0 1
More than High School Degree 0.303 0.460 0 1
Income by decile
1st decile 0.112 0.316 0 1
2nd decile 0.100 0.300 0 1
3rd decile 0.098 0.297 0 1
4h decile 0.108 0.310 0 1
5th decile 0.104 0.305 0 1
6th decile 0.101 0.302 0 1
7th decile 0.092 0.289 0 1
8th decile 0.101 0.301 0 1
9th decile 0.095 0.293 0 1
10th decile 0.090 0.286 0 1
Previous tenure
Private tenants 0.646 0.445 0 1
Public tenants 0.271 0.478 0 1
Others 0.083 0.276 0 1
Tenure
Homeowners 0.464 0.499 0 1
Private tenants 0.253 0.434 0 1
Public tenants 0.253 0.435 0 1
Others 0.030 0.172 0 1
Year of last mobility
1979-1984 0.086 0.280 0 1
1985-1988 0.091 0.287 0 1
1988-1992 0.066 0.248 0 1
1993-1997 0.093 0.291 0 1
1998-2002 0.251 0.434 0 1
2003-2006 0.413 0.493 0 1
% of PH among rental housing in the urban area 0.379 0.099 0.140 0.661
Observations 3,773
Notes: The individual characteristics (gender, age, citizenship, education) are for the
household head. Income is household total income per consumption unit.
if they had not benefited from low rent levels while tenants. The income distribution of public
tenants who became homeowners is not very different from that of the whole population. In
13
Table 5: Sample tenure transitions
Former tenure Current tenure
Homeownership Private renting Public housing Other Total
Private renting 66.0 81.7 46.9 50.0 64.7
Public housing 25.2 12.2 45.7 23.3 27.0
Other 8.8 6.0 7.4 26.7 8.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share of total sample 46.2 25.4 25.3 3.1 100.0
contrast, public housing renters who made a transition to private renting (column 3 of Table 6)
are much more concentrated in the lowest income deciles (46.8% of them are in the first three
deciles).
To estimate the true effect of a spell in public housing on the dynamics to homeownership,
we need to control for household characteristics, including unobserved ones.
4.2 Estimation Results
In the following subsections, we present several specifications aimed at carefully highlighting the
impact of the different features of our model. First, we present results of single duration models
of homeownership before turning to the two-equations model to estimate the effect of public
housing on homeownership accounting for endogeneity of previous tenure.
4.2.1 Single Duration Model
Table 7 presents three different specifications of the single duration model of homeownership.
The first specification (column 1) includes only exogenous covariates. The second controls for a
potential spell in public housing without accounting for its endogeneity (column 2), while the
third includes unobserved heterogeneity (column 3). The comparison between the former and
the latter provides a simple test of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity.
The effect of the covariates on the expected duration before homeownership attainment
are presented. Therefore, a positive (negative) parameter indicates that the specific variable
increases (decreases) age at first-time homeownership.
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Table 6: Sample characteristics depending on current and previous tenure
Homeowners Other tenures All
Previous spell in public housing yes no yes no
Female 27.1 24.1 45.4 42.4 34.8
Living with partner 83.6 83.7 47.0 48.4 66.6
Number of children 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.2
Citizenship
French at birth 94.1 96.0 84.5 83.0 89.0
French by naturalization 3.2 1.8 6.0 4.3 3.6
Foreign citizenship 2.7 2.2 9.5 12.7 7.4
Education
Less than high school degree 74.1 51.9 77.3 57.1 60.4
High school degree 7.3 9.0 9.3 10.3 9.4
More than high school degree 18.6 39.1 13.4 32.5 30.2
Income by Decile
1st decile 3.6 3.8 17.7 17.4 11.2
2nd decile 8.4 5.2 16.4 12.7 10.0
3rd decile 10.7 6.2 12.7 10.7 9.8
4ht decile 10.2 9.7 13.1 11.0 10.8
5th decile 10.7 10.3 10.5 10.6 10.4
6th decile 13.2 11.1 8.9 9.1 10.1
7th decile 10.7 11.1 6.2 8.1 9.2
8th decile 12.5 13.6 6.2 7.7 10.1
9th decile 12.7 12.5 5.2 7.7 9.5
10th decile 7.3 16.5 3.1 5.0 9.0
Age at first-time homeownership
Less than 30 years 33.9 33.6 - - -
30 - 35 years 30.9 30.0 - - -
36 - 40 years 15.7 15.0 - - -
41 - 45 years 9.6 8.7 - - -
46 - 50 years 4.3 5.1 - - -
51 - 55 years 3.0 2.9 - - -
56 - 60 years 1.8 2.5 - - -
60 - 65 years 0.2 1.5 - - -
More than 65 years 0.7 0.8 - - -
Observations 440 1,305 581 1,451 3,773
The main difference between the three specifications is the effect of income. When we do
not include unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficients indicate a counter-intuitive result; that is,
low income households achieve homeownership sooner. However, this result is reversed with the
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity, with richer households attaining homeownership more
rapidly. We suspect unobserved heterogeneity to capture the heterogeneity in homeownership
strategy with regard to housing characteristics. Some households, particularly among high-
income households, might buy larger houses, and achieve homeownership later in their life-cycle.
Introducing unobserved heterogeneity might control this effect, alleviating the omitted variable
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Table 7: Single duration model of age at first-time homeownership
Variables Without unobserved Without unobserved With unobserved
heterogeneity; heterogeneity; heterogeneity;
spell in PH not included spell in PH included spell in PH included
(1) (2) (3)
Spell in public housing 0.023** (0.01) 0.022** (0.01)
Female -0.010 (0.01) -0.011 (0.01) -0.011 (0.01)
Living with partner 0.012 (0.01) 0.012 (0.01) 0.014 (0.01)
Mean number of children 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01)
Citizenship
French at birth Reference Reference Reference
French by naturalization 0.054**(0.02) 0.053**(0.02) 0.059***(0.01)
Foreign citizenship 0.039***(0.01) 0.041***(0.01) 0.061***(0.01)
Diplomas
Less than high school degree 0.162***(0.02) 0.161***(0.02) 0.174***(0.02)
High school degree Reference Reference Reference
University degree -0.011 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) -0.112***(0.01)
Income by decile
1st decile -0.097***(0.02) -0.097***(0.02) 0.131***(0.02)
2nd decile -0.070***(0.02) -0.071***(0.02) 0.109***(0.02)
3rd decile -0.066***(0.02) -0.067***(0.02) 0.003 (0.02)
4th decile -0.041***(0.02) -0.041***(0.02) 0.011 (0.02)
5th decile -0.051** (0.02) -0.051***(0.02) 0.009 (0.02)
6th decile Reference Reference Reference
7th decile -0.004 (0.02) 0.004 (0.02) 0.007 (0.02)
8th decile 0.049 (0.02) 0.048**(0.02) -0.075***(0.02)
9th decile 0.065** (0.02) 0.065**(0.03) -0.091***(0.02)
10th decile 0.196***(0.04) 0.197***(0.04) -0.101***(0.02)
Time dummies
1979-1983 Reference Reference Reference
1984-1987 -0.223***(0.02) -0.222***(0.02) -0.221***(0.02)
1988-1991 -0.036***(0.01) -0.037***(0.01) -0.035***(0.01)
1992-1996 -0.083***(0.02) -0.081***(0.02) -0.082***(0.02)
1997-2001 -0.159***(0.01) -0.157***(0.02) -0.158***(0.02)
2002-2006 -0.303***(0.01) -0.301***(0.02) -0.302***(0.02)
Probability masses
P (νh = νh1) - - 0.43***(0.04)
Points of support
νh1 - - 2.676***(0.32)
νh2 - - 3.523***(0.47)
Observations 3773 3773 3773
Standard errors clustered on urban areas between parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
bias.
As to the effect of public housing accommodation, the naive estimation of the single duration
model shows that public housing tenants achieve first-time homeownership later than the others.
Given that the descriptive statistics showed that public tenants who buy a house were not older
than other new homeowners, this result might be driven by the low transition rate from public
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housing to homeownership. In the next step, we turn to the two-equations model to obtain
unbiased estimates of the effect of public housing.
4.2.2 Two-Equations Model
Table 8 presents two specifications: a two-step estimation and a simultaneous estimation includ-
ing unobserved heterogeneity. Columns (1) and (3) present the parameters of the public housing
equation, while the determinants of homeownership are displayed in columns (2) and (4). The
first specification in columns (1) and (2) provides a benchmark that is useful to characterize the
bias due to the omission of unobserved heterogeneity. We comment on the results of our best
specification, presented in columns (3) and (4).
Our preferred specification, the one with the lowest BIC, is the model including unobserved
heterogeneity as a mixture with two points of support. The locations of the points of support are
significant in both equations. Our instrument, the percentage of public housing among renters
in the urban area, has a positive effect on the probability to have a spell in public housing.
The probability to have a spell in public housing is higher for single mother households and
increases with the number of children, which is consistent with the public housing priority code.
The number of children increases the probability to have been housed in public housing previ-
ously but increases the age at homeownership achievement. French citizenship has a significant
impact on both the probability to have a spell in public housing and age at first-time home-
ownership. Immigrants have a higher probability to have a spell in public housing. They also
generally buy a house later in their life, if ever.
The variables that approximate permanent income (education and current income) have a
significant effect in both equations. The probability to have a spell in public housing decreases
with income and educational level. The effect is the same for the age at homeownership with
high-educated and high-income individuals having the lowest age at homeownership attainment.
The comparison of columns (2) and (4) shows that the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity
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Table 8: Two equations model of public housing and age at first-time homeownership
Two-step estimation Simultaneous estimation
without with
unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Public Age at Public Age at
housing homeownership housing homeownership
Spell in public housing -0.131**(0.05) -0.129**(0.04)
Female 0.147***(0.03) -0.003 (0.11) 0.145***(0.03) -0.002 (0.10)
Living with partner 0.068***(0.01) 0.013**(0.01) 0.056***(0.01) - 0.009 (0.01)
Mean number of children 0.07***(0.02) 0.008* (0.004) 0.07**(0.03) 0.007 (0.005)
Citizenship
Native Reference Reference Reference Reference
French by naturalization 0.162 (0.12) 0.064***(0.02) 0.153***(0.05) 0.076***(0.02)
Foreign citizenship -0.326**(0.12) 0.029* (0.02) 0.552**(0.11) 0.049*(0.03)
Diplomas
¡ high school degree 0.255***(0.09) 0.173***(0.02) 0.278***(0.09) 0.152***(0.02)
High school degree Reference Reference Reference Reference
University degree -0.411***(0.12) -0.025 (0.02) -0.392***(0.12) -0.105***(0.02)
Income by decile
1st decile -0.052 (0.11) -0.102***(0.02) 0.209***(0.07) 0.124***(0.02)
2nd decile 0.042 (0.06) -0.069**(0.02) 0.152***(0.04) 0.112***(0.02)
3rd decile 0.164*(0.07) -0.060**(0.02) 0.175***(0.05) 0.082***(0.02)
4th decile -0.033 (0.08) -0.043**(0.02) 0.036 (0.06) 0.054**(0.02)
5th decile -0.074 (0.07) -0.057***(0.02) -0.054 (0.08) -0.062 (0.06)
6th decile Reference Reference Reference Reference
7th decile -0.144*(0.08) -0.009 (0.02) -0.151**(0.07) -0.007 (0.02)
8th decile 0.005 (0.07) 0.049**(0.02) -0.112**(0.05) -0.069**(0.02)
9th decile 0.013 (0.09) 0.067**(0.03) -0.109**(0.04) -0.047**(0.01)
10th decile -0.316**(0.10) 0.189***(0.04) -0.316**(0.10) -0.195***(0.04)
Temporal dummies
1979-1983 Reference Reference Reference Reference
1984-1987 -0.268 (0.07) -0.241***(0.02) -0.267 (0.07) -0.248***(0.02)
1988-1991 -0.046***(0.11) -0.039***(0.01) -0.049***(0.11) -0.042***(0.01)
1992-1996 -0.394***(0.06) -0.102***(0.02) -0.393***(0.06) -0.111***(0.02)
1997-2001 -0.349***(0.08) -0.178***(0.02) -0.395***(0.08) -0.182***(0.02)
2002-2006 -0.259***(0.07) -0.319***(0.02) -0.352***(0.07) -0.381***(0.09)
% of PH among rental housing 2.90***(0.19) 3 .11***(0.45)
Probability masses
p11 - - 0.327***(0.03)
p12 - - 0.192***(0.02)
p21 - - 0.302***(0.02)
Points of support
νh1 - - 3.023***(0.32)
νh2 - - 3.878***(0.47)
νp1 - - 1.201***(0.24)
νp2 - - 2.568***(0.37)
Observations 3773 3773
p11 = P (νh = νh1, νp = νp1), p12 = P (νh = νh1, νp = νp2), p21 = P (νh = νh2, νp = νp1)
Standard errors clustered on urban areas between parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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has the same effect as in the single duration model.
The time-period dummies coefficients are consistent with the decreasing transition rate to
homeownership. Our estimates show that age at first-time homeownership decreased signifi-
cantly at the beginning of the 80’s, that witnessed the growing momentum of the French home-
ownership promotion policy launched in 1977. Age at first-time homeownership increased in the
subsequent years, with the end of some low-interest subsidized mortgages. However, the intro-
duction of a zero-interest mortgage in 1996 (the “Pret a taux zero”, see Gobillon and Le Blanc
2008), followed by the decrease in the mortgage interest rate, that allowed young households to
increase the length of their mortgages, contributed to a reduction of the age at homeownership
at the end of our observation period.
Finally, the spell in public housing, our variable of interest, has a negative effect on age
at first-time homeownership. Having a spell in public housing allows some households, ceteris
paribus, to access homeownership earlier. The point estimates obtained in the simultaneous
estimation with unobserved heterogeneity is slightly lower in absolute value than that of the two-
step estimation, consistent with what could be expected once the correlation due to unobserved
heterogeneity is taken into account. The standard errors show however that this difference is
not significant. This estimate implies that the net balance between the saving effects and the
potential negative externalities associated with public housing is positive. Our main result is
thus consistent with the idea that the public housing policy allows some households, who would
never have become homeowners otherwise, to save more during their spell in public housing,
and enable them to buy a house.
4.3 Robustness Checks
As explained in subsection 3.1, we performed an adjustment of our sample after the pseudo-panel
procedure in order to reproduce the annual mobility rate, as observed on the original 2006 FHS
sample. This adjustment consists of reducing the number of recent moving households in the
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sample. We test the sensitivity of our main result to this sample adjustment, by running our
estimation on the sample including recent movers that were dropped at the sample adjustment
step. The parameter of interest in the estimation on this new sample is -0.447 (standard error
0.098), which is higher in absolute value than the effect estimated on our main working sample.
This estimates thus points to an even stronger favorable effect of public housing on the dynamics
to homeownership. This change in the point estimate is consistent with the bias induced by the
selection into mobility.
Our pseudo-panel method also excludes the less mobile households because our matching
procedure does not recover mobilities that occurred before 1979. To assess on the impact of
this restriction, we use a new sample with all the households surveyed in the 2006 FHS. The
former tenure considered is that of the housing occupied four years before the survey. This
is the tenure of previous housing for recent movers and the tenure of current housing for the
households which entered their housing before 2002. This presents obviously the downside that
the real previous tenure of households who moved before 2002 is ignored. Given this definition of
former tenure, our model is estimated on the sample of all households that were not previously
homeowners, including non-mobile households. To observe this picture at different points in
time over our study period, we perform this estimation for each of the FHS that have been used
in the pseudo-panel procedure, thus covering the 1979-2006 period.
The coefficient estimates presented in Table 9 point to a favorable impact of public housing
on transitions to homeownership for all the sub-periods. The absolute value of the estimates
is high for the 1988 FHS and lower for the subsequent years. This evolution is consistent with
the general context of homeownership attainment, as the rise in housing prices that started in
France in 1999 probably impacted more strongly low-income households.
In addition, the estimated effects are higher in magnitude than those estimated on the
pseudo-panel sample. This can be understood as the consequence of the very frequent moves
made by private renters within the private renting sector. On the contrary of private tenants,
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Table 9: Estimation of the two-equations model on all households not previously homeowners
1984 FHS 1988 FHS 1992 FHS 1996 FHS 2002 FHS 2006 FHS
Spell in public housing -0.152*** -0.474*** -0.296** -0.351** -0.339** -0.151*
(0.076) (0.115) (0.127) (0.153) (0.132) (0.08)
Observations 15,152 16,821 22,092 15,717 14,100 18,212
Standard errors clustered on urban areas between parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Notes: The estimations are performed on the whole samples of the French Housing Surveys,
keeping only households that were not previously homeowners. The existence of a spell in PH
is measured through tenure of the housing occupied four years preceding the survey for recent
movers and through tenure of current housing for all other households. Control variables include:
gender, living in couple, number of children, citizenship, education, income decile, as well as
changes in the family composition, changes in employment situation and inheritance receipt for
the 2006 FHS estimation. Previous tenure in public housing is instrumented with the share of
public housing among the rental housing stock in the urban area.
public tenants have lower mobility rates, but when they move, they tend to make a transition to
homeownership. For example, in the 2006 FHS, mobile public tenants were almost as likely as
moving private renters to make a transition to homeownership (27.6% against 31.9% for private
tenants), despite their lower income level.
5 Conclusion
Although public housing is a policy designed to improve the housing conditions of the low-income
households, there are very few research on its effects on tenants’ outcomes. Our analysis con-
tributes to fill this gap by looking at the effect of public housing accommodation on subsequent
homeownership attainment in the French case. Our results suggest that public housing plays an
important role in helping some households achieve homeownership. More precisely, compared
to private renting, living in public housing speeds up the transition to homeownership. This
result does not induce that all public tenants can attain homeownership; some of them, will
never be able to accumulate enough wealth to constitute a downpayment. In contrast to other
policies toward homeownership, public housing relies on the capacity of the household to accu-
mulate savings. In other words, this “aid” auto-selects the public tenants that are the most able
to attain homeownership. As a consequence, one can wonder about the respective benefits of
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mortgage interest deduction policy versus a public housing policy that would subsidize housing
expenditures. This aspect of public housing has never been accounted for before.
We believe that our careful methodology provides a reliable estimate of the impact of public
housing on the dynamics to homeownership. In the absence of a long-period panel data that
would be required to study housing transitions, we developed a pseudo-panel approach. Further,
we dealt with the endogeneity of public housing accommodation by using an instrument, that
has been shown not to impact age at homeownership. Finally, our econometric model takes
unobserved heterogeneity into account.
Our results suggest two types of households in the public housing. Some households might
never leave public housing because of an unobserved taste or a high preference for the present.
For this type of households, public housing might constitute a trap. For a second type, public
housing might, on the contrary, represent a springboard to homeownership by allowing them
to save more. Therefore, any assessment of the impact of public housing has to account for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Of course, a complete evaluation of the public housing policy would require to quantify the
other effects of public housing on its tenants and to compare this indirect form of homeowner-
ship aid to other measures promoting homeownership. The efficiency of public housing could
for instance be compared to that of mortgage interest deduction measures. In addition, the
macroeconomic impact of the supply of public housing on the other parts of the housing market
should also be considered. This is beyond the scope of this paper but will deserve attention in
future research.
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